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Abstract:
Economic globalization is a phenomenon driving major developments in the international
system. With the force of this phenomenon shaping events within states and interactions
among them, the question of economic globalization’s impact on state capacity is worthy of an
in-depth analysis. In this work I use economic globalization as the central explanatory variable
and state capacity as the dependent variable and seek to establish an empirical relationship
between the two that will offer the social science community a better understanding of how this
phenomenon is shaping state capacity in developing countries. Based on available scholarship,
I argue that economic globalization in its current form poses major issues for state capacity in
developing states at international, national, and structural levels. I explore policy
ramifications for the potential threat that economic globalization poses for that ability of state
capacity in the developing world to mitigate economic globalization’s destabilizing effects.
Introduction:
Economic globalization as it relates to the developing world is a relatively new
phenomenon. The first era of post-World War II globalization embodied in the Bretton Woods
system largely excluded the developing world, much of which were still undergoing the trials
and tribulations of decolonization during the 1950s, 1960s, and into the 1970s when Bretton
Woods faded away. By the 1980s however, the integration of developing states into the global
economy coincided with the rise of neoliberalism that replaced the Keynesian economic logic
underlying Bretton Woods. This neoliberal economic thinking encouraged the rollback of state

Zak 2
involvement in the economy, reduction of taxes and regulations, reduction in the size of the
social welfare state, and weakening of the power of organized labor (Evans, 1997). These
policies, which soon famously became dubbed the “Washington Consensus” became the new
economic orthodoxy in the developed world with serious ramifications for developing states’
political economies and with it their state capacities.
The impact of economic globalization on developing states’ capacities has been
significant since their integration into the neoliberal global economy in the 1980s. Putzel
(2005) mentions how economic globalization should not be viewed as a monolithic event
impacting countries in the same fashion; rather, globalization has varying degrees of influence on
state capacity based on their characteristics. These characteristics of states can exist at both the
institutional and structural levels of states both internationally and nationally. By analyzing
available scholarship, a better understanding can be achieved of what precise institutional and
structural factors determine economic globalization’s impact on state capacity in developing
states. Based on the scholarship I examine, I hypothesize in this work that economic
globalization will result in a reduction of state capacity for developing states.
Literature Review:
The role of international financial institutions and through them the developed world’s
influence on compelling developing states to adopt neoliberal economies consistent with
economic globalization has had major ramifications for state capacity. This is because as Putzel
(2005) states the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), champions of neoliberal
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economics, are Western institutions and as a result have been used to advance the developed
world’s economic agenda of export-oriented economies in their tireless pursuit of markets. Evans
(1997) argues that the structural adjustment programs developing states have undertaken at the
recommendations of the IMF and World Bank in order to transition to a neoliberal economy
have
significantly weakened state capacity in developing states.
The liberalization of capital flows consistent with economic globalization in its current form
has seriously reduced state capacity in a number of developing states. This is because states
now lack the capacity to manage markets increasingly dominated by global supply
chains regarding capital flows. This weakens state capacity in these developing states as their
jurisdiction over regulating markets is restricted. Liberalized capital flows pushed by the IMF
and World Bank have also empowered Multinational Corporations (MNCs) at the expense of
state power as these developing states are not able to monitor nor effectively regulate MNCs’
activities (Evans, 1997). As Evans (1997) goes on to argue, state capacity in these
developing states is further weakened as states cannot protect their citizens from the economic
effects of over speculation and consumer abuse that have resulted from liberalized capital flows.
This is because the IMF and World Bank have also encouraged a weakening of the regulatory
state consistent with neoliberal economic thinking that seeks minimal government involvement
in the economy. Therefore, with regards to financial policies international institutions have
played an important role in encouraging developing states to liberalize capital flows in order to

globalize economically, with negative effects for state capacity in the developing world.
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International institutions have also encouraged developing states to engage in cut-throat
competition with each other in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), a hallmark of
economic globalization. This has had the effect of reducing state capacity further as Evans
(1997) states. This is because developing states in order to remain competitive in a globalized
economy are forced to implement austerity measures, drastically cutting public services and
limiting state involvement in the economy. This serves to weaken state capacity as they are no
longer able to effectively manage the economy, oversee and regulate markets, or provide public
services to ensure adequate living standards for citizens (Evans 1997). Rudra (2002) argues
developing states in particular have weakened their labor unions and social welfare states in
order to attract FDI from MNCs. This weakens state capacity as Rudra (2002) argues because the
state is less involved in protecting the welfare of its citizens and as a result, living standards
become stagnant and economic insecurity more pronounced. Eakin and Lemos (2006) also
argue that the cut-throat competition prioritizing growth above all else has led to the
evisceration of environmental regulations in developing states. This weakens state capacity in the
long term as in order to attract FDI environmental degradation becomes accepted as a means of
doing business. By doing this, developing states are exacerbating the crisis of climate change and
the political, economic, and health risks involved that will place great long-term strains on state
capacity. Evans (1997) refers to this cut-throat competition for FDI as a “race to the bottom”
which, encouraged by the IMF and World Bank, has placed great strains on state capacity in

developing states and weaked it considerably in the process.
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Moore (2011) has argued that austerity measures and neoliberal economic policies pressed
by international institutions on the developing world have deprived governments of revenue in
developing states. This weakens state capacity as developing states lack revenue to fund public
services such as education, health care, and social welfare programs. Economic globalization has
also created more opportunity for smuggling to occur, further depriving states of revenue as new
markets to the developed world open up. This further weakens state capacity in developing states
as they are unable to monitor and thus collect revenue from these transactions. The example of
blood diamonds in Sierra Leone is significant as the smuggling of diamonds to the developed
world fueled civil war in the country, leading to a period of state failure (Moore, 2011).
Increased
opportunity for tax havens is another problem facing state capacity in developing states as they
are pressured to embrace economic globalization from the IMF and World Bank. Tax havens
enable the wealthiest in these developing states to shield their income from taxation, depriving
the government of revenue and forcing them to shift the tax burden to the middle and working
classes. In the process state capacity becomes weaker as its ability to collect revenue decreases
and through taxation of poorer classes less revenue is collected overall (Moore, 2011).
Williamson (2005) takes a hybrid approach toward economic globalization’s impact on state
capacity and the role of the international financial institutions. Challenging the notion of a
“Washington Consensus” of neoliberalism, Williamson (2005) argues that this consensus has
broken down. Disputes between the U.S. Treasury Department and the IMF over liberalized

capital flows and income distribution in developing states are examples of how this supposed
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consensus driving neoliberal economic globalization is in fact contested. Williamson’s (2005)
hybrid approach to the role of international institutions’ impact on state capacity comes from his
selective praise and criticism of different aspects of the neoliberal agenda pushed by the IMF and
World Bank. The liberalization of trade and privatization of major industries has had a positive
impact on economic growth and higher living standards, in the process strengthening state
capacity as these countries are benefiting from economic development (Williamson, 2005).
Williamson (2005) does concede, however, the need for economic globalization in developing
states to include promotion of institutions rather than simply policy as a means to prevent
state capacity weakening as a result of economic globalization.
The need for the IMF and World Bank to promote the establishment of institutions along
with policy is the only way to assure structural adjustment programs result in strengthened state
capacity from economic prosperity as Williamson (2005) argues. Efficient tax collecting
institutions, competent civil service, and sensible government involvement in the economy
are needed in order to mitigate the negative impacts of economic globalization such as
reduced sovereignty and rising inequality. In this respect, Williamson (2005) diverges from the
pillar of the “Washington Consensus” of minimal government involvement in the economy.
Recognizing the importance of the state being involved in the economy to manage it effectively
and protect citizens from the insecurities of markets, Williamson (2005) advocates modifying the
“Washington Consensus” in order to make it more successful while supporting other central

tenets such as liberalized trade, FDI, and privatized industries. By doing this a more sustainable
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form of economic globalization can be achieved that promotes both economic growth
and human security that will strengthen rather than weaken state capacity in the developing
world. Williamson (2005) therefore advocates the adoption of these policies by the IMF and
World Bank in order to enable structural adjustment programs in developing states to strengthen
rather than weaken state capacity.
Weiss (2000) takes a contrarian approach to economic globalization’s impact on state
capacity and the role of international institutions in driving it. Economic globalization and its
empowerment of international institutions is not occurring at the expense of state capacity in the
developing world but is only a relative challenge. The social impacts of economic globalization
such as urbanization, environmentalism, and labor rights are issues solved at the national, not
international level. This strengthens state capacity as states have jurisdiction to manage these
problems themselves (Weiss, 2000). Weiss (2000) also argues that because states are engaging in
economic globalization voluntarily, they are not experiencing reduced state capacity. In fact,
economic globalization with its higher economic growth rates is generating more tax revenue
and spurring economic development that is strengthening state capacity. The issue of economic
integration characteristic of economic globalization is also enhancing state capacity in
developing states. This is because it is enabling developing states to maximize their economic
and political influence on the world stage through Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)
(Weiss, 2000).

The argument presented by Weiss (2000) contests the arguments of previous scholars
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regarding economic globalization’s impact on state capacity and the role of international
institutions in it. There is a major critique of her argument, however, which its is important to
mention.Weiss’s (2000) assertion that developing states are engaging in economic globalization
voluntarily is an incomplete understanding of power dynamics underlying the global economy.
As Putzel (2005) emphasizes how international financial institutions driving economic
globalization are controlled by the developed world, the developing world is forced to play by
the rules of the developed states in order to have an opportunity to enjoy the benefits of
economic globalization. This is understood in the neoliberal structural adjustment programs that
have shaped the domestic economies of developing states in what Evans (1997) characterized as
a “race to the bottom” to attract FDI with dire consequences for state capacity in developing
states as mentioned earlier in this work. Those factors demonstrate how developing states are not
necessarily engaging in economic globalization voluntarily; rather, they simply have accepted
the risks that economic globalization poses for state capacity as they have deemed it too great a
risk to be left out of a rapidly globalizing economy. This discrepancy in scholarship between
Weiss (2000) and other scholars regarding international institutions and their role in economic
globalization’s impact on state capacity will be settled in the results and analysis section once an
empirical relationship between economic globalization and state capacity in developing states is
established.
Case studies of the role international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF play in

driving economic globalization and its impact on state capacity seem to support the majority of
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scholarship analyzed earlier in this work. In the case of Southeast Asia amidst a financial crisis
in the 1990s, the IMF and World Bank engaged in structural adjustment policies that weakened
state capacity in those states. Englehart (2012) argues that the IMF and World Bank
have actually weakened institutions in those developing states and also have fueled infighting
within governments of these states, with negative consequences for state capacity.
The case of the Philippines provides an example of how these institutions insert themselves
into the domestic politics of developing states to advance their own agendas. The IMF and World
Bank supported factions within the Filipino government in favor of privatizing the water supply
and, as a result, the Filipino government became divided and less effective (Englehart, 2012).
The privatization of the water supply was achieved. However, what ensued demonstrates the role
these international institutions play in pressuring developing states to embrace economic
globalization in its neoliberal form with concomitant reduction in state capacity. The
privatization of the water supply led to rampant corruption as pieces of the industry became
vehicles for patronage and co-opting elites in the country. Equal access to water also became a
major issue as communities became under-serviced and increased poverty and inequality resulted
(Englehart, 2012). The example of the Philippines and their experiment with economic
globalization driven by the IMF and World Bank demonstrates how a sole focus on how policy
rather than institutions is so essential encourages developing states to adopt economies
they lack the institutions to sustain. As a result, economic globalization in this case led to

reduced state capacity as an essential good was underserviced and corruption increased
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dramatically.
The case of the Philippines proves no outlier in terms of the role of international
institutions play in imposing economic globalization on developing states with negative
consequences for state capacity. Jinadu (2010) argues that the IMF and World Bank have played
a negative role in state capacity in African states in relation to economic globalization. With the
encouragement of austerity measures to slash public services and the privatization of industries,
inequality and corruption have increased considerably on the continent. Jinadu (2010) mentions
that African states are especially vulnerable to weakened state capacity from rising inequality as
a lasting legacy of colonialism has created artificial states with large levels of ethno-religious
heterogeneity. This makes African states more vulnerable to horizontal inequalities, inequalities
that coincide with an identity group, which, in the absence of sufficient public services, can
become an explosive issue leading to weakened state capacity and also state failure as these
inequalities can spawn civil war. In the absence of a competent civil service, rule of law, and tax
collecting institutions to fund public services, African states are also not in a position to
embrace economic globalization in its neoliberal form, as Jinadu (2010) argues, because African
states are too weak to engage with international financial institutions on an equal footing.
This demonstrates another case of how the IMF and World Bank play a pivotal role in driving
economic globalization in developing states. Also, with its short-sighted focus on policy rather
than institutions, developing countries are experiencing drastically reduced state capacity, which,

in the case of African states, has at times even led to outright state failure and subsequent
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civil conflict. As Jinadu (2010) argues further, the rash of civil conflict across Africa during a
period of hyper-globalization in the 1990s is no coincidence; rather, it attests to the influence
economic globalization has on reducing state capacity in developing states.
The role the IMF and World Bank play in driving economic globalization and
with it, influencing state capacity is relevant in the case of Latin American states as well. Eakin
and Lemos (2006) argue that international financial institutions have pressured Latin American
states to adopt neoliberal economies with similar negative results for state capacity. With the
growth of FDI, MNCs have become empowered at the expense of states. For example, MNCs in
Latin America are heavily involved in biotechnology as it relates to agriculture. Eakin and
Lemos (2006) has argued this has reduced state capacity in these states as they are unable to
regulate these MNCs effectively and, as a result, concerns about consumer protection from
GMOs go unaddressed. This inability to regulate markets stems from these international
institutions encouragement of civil service reforms that have resulted in sharply reduced state
capacity as the administrative apparatus of the state becomes weakened.
The example of Mexico demonstrates this as between 2001-2005 the Mexican Agricultural
Ministry reduced its size in terms of civil servants by thirteen percent (Eakin and Lemos, 2006).
Although consistent with the neoliberal ideology preached by the IMF and World Bank of
minimal government involvement in the economy, this caused great strains on Mexico’s
administrative capacity as it relates to agriculture. Farms failed with the lack of agricultural

subsidies and the rollback of government involvement in the agricultural industry kept Mexico
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from shielding farmers displaced by economic globalization in the form of social welfare
programs (Eakin and Lemos, 2006). This resulted in reduced state capacity as the government
was unable to manage fluctuations in the economy and the agricultural sector in particular as
pressure from international financial institutions encouraged Mexico to reduce its
administrative capacity, leading to weaker state capacity.
Having examined scholarship regarding the role international institutions play in driving
economic globalization in the developing world, it can be inferred that they play a pivotal role
and in the process have greatly influenced state capacity with largely negative consequences.
However, scholarship demonstrates that international institutions alone do not impact
economic globalization’s influence on state capacity. Rather, they are but one of a number of
major factors that shape state capacity. Robinson (2008) argues that it is important to analyze
institutions at the national level to gain a complete understanding of how economic globalization
shapes state capacity in developing states. Williamson (2005) argues the need for economic
globalization to emphasize institution building as well as policy in developing states. It thus can
be inferred that it is as important to analyze institutions within developing states as it is to focus
on international institutions in order to determine economic globalization’s impact on state
capacity in the developing world. Central among such national institutions are
a competent bureaucratic apparatus, redistributive capacity in the form of a social welfare state,
and the rule of law.

The existence of a competent bureaucratic apparatus is an essential component to strong state
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capacity. Putzel (2005) mentions the importance of bureaucratic institutions in governing the
state effectively, implementing policy, managing the economy, and generating tax revenue to
fund public services. It is because of this a bureaucratic apparatus is an important component to
state capacity as it goes to the ability of the state to provide goods and services and also govern.
The existence of bureaucratic institutions is important for sustaining a transition to a liberalized
economy from economic globalization without experiencing reduced state capacity. Robinson
(2008) mentions how many developing states lack a bureaucratic apparatus capable of governing
the country or collecting tax revenue effectively. As a result of this developing states embracing
economic globalization lack the necessary bureaucratic institutions to manage it successfully.
Bureaucratic institutions are needed at the national level to manage the economy, combat over
speculation and consumer abuse, regulate markets, and generate tax revenue for public services
(Robinson, 2008). The lack of a sufficient bureaucratic apparatus in many developing states is a
reason why economic globalization has led to weaker state capacity. Developing states have
adopted globalized neoliberal economies that they lack the bureaucratic institutions to manage
and as a result experience reduced state capacity from economic globalization.
The redistributive capacity of the state, its ability to provide public services, along with
bureaucratic institutions, is another major component of state capacity that is heavily influenced
by economic globalization. Crepaz (2001) argues the importance of redistributive capacity in the
form of a welfare state to ensure adequate living standards for citizens, combating inequality, and

shielding those displaced by economic globalization. Economic globalization, however, has had
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major ramifications for state capacity in regard to the redistributive capacity of the state. Crepaz
(2001) mentions how economic globalization has caused developing states to reduce the size of
their social welfare states in order to attract FDI and conform with the neoliberal model of
minimal state involvement in the economy. This presents developing states with a major
dilemma as they need a sufficient welfare state in order to manage economic globalization, but
are forced to reduce the size of it to remain competitive in the global economy, weakening state
capacity in the process (Crepaz, 2001). Thus, in order to embrace economic globalization, the
ability of the state to manage the adverse effects associated with economic globalization such as
higher levels of inequality, environmental degradation, and displacement of workers from
automation with public services becomes limited and state capacity becomes weakened.
Rudra (2002) also mentions how economic globalization has disproportionately led to the
erosion of the social welfare state in developing countries. This is because as developing states
possess an excess of low-skilled workers in comparison to the developed world, developing
states are often considered a center for MNCs to conduct FDI. This leads to an intensified effort
to roll back the welfare state and, along with it, labor rights and environmental regulations in
order to attract those MNCs to developing states. As a result, developing states are less able to
protect citizens from the adverse effects of economic globalization. Spending trends on social
welfare as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) attests to Rudra’s (2002) argument as
the developing world spends five percent of its GDP on social welfare as opposed to fifteen

percent in the developed world (Rudra, 2002). This demonstrates how economic globalization
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can lead to the roll back of the welfare state and with it weakened state capacity in developing
states. It also underscores how developing states in particular are vulnerable to this as their larger
labor pool of low-skilled workers makes them an attractive option for FDI through MNCs.
Charron (2013) mentions the impact of this on public services with the case of East European
states in the European Union (EU). Following the EU’s enlargement in the early 2000s, the effort
to attract FDI in East European states has led to a weakening of the social welfare state
disproportionate to the more developed West European member states. This, as a result, has
undermined the ability of these East European governments to mitigate the negative
consequences of economic globalization and higher levels of regional and human inequality exist
with the absence of a sufficient welfare state (Charron, 2013). Therefore, economic globalization
poses a distinct risk for the redistributive capacity of developing states and with it the risk of
weakened state capacity as developing states find themselves unable to manage negative
consequences resulting from economic globalization such as labor displacement from automation
and rising inequality through social welfare programs.
The labor movements of developing states are also considerably weaker as, in order to attract
FDI, labor rights are often restricted. The relative strength of labor movements in the developed
world through unions has enabled citizens to extract more services from their governments as
they have an organized lobby (Rudra, 2002). Rudra (2002) therefore mentions how the
weakness of labor movements in developing states has rendered citizens less able to lobby their

governments for more social welfare spending to secure higher living standards and achieve a
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more egalitarian society. This is another important factor in developing states experiencing a
rapid erosion of the welfare state in order to embrace economic globalization, one that has dire
consequences for state capacity. As labor movements are weakened along with the welfare state
in order to attract FDI, the ability of the state to compensate citizens threatened by the societal
strains of economic globalization is reduced. As a result, higher levels of inequality and
socio-economic deprivation persist that developing states are unable to address, leading them to
experience weakened state capacity as a result.
The existence of the rule of law is an important institution at the national level necessary for
stronger state capacity. Silverstein (2003) argues the importance of the rule of law for state
capacity and notes how it is being influenced by economic globalization. A strong rule of law is
necessary for the state to be able to hold its leaders accountable, monitor economic transactions,
combat smuggling, and reduce corruption. The capacity of the state to do this is important in
order to manage economic globalization more successfully and resist the threat of weakened
state capacity (Silverstein, 2003). Moore (2011) argues how the absence of a rule of law
increases opportunities for smuggling of goods and hoarding government funds with economic
globalization as access to global markets expands. This weakens states as it deprives
them of valuable revenue. In addition, bad behavior going unpunished encourages more
abuse of power as leaders are not held accountable for their actions (Silverstein, 2003).
Economic globalization is likely to reduce state capacity in developing states because of high

levels of corruption that stems from the lack of a rule of law. As Silverstein (2003) suggests,
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economic globalization and the opportunities it entails can incentivize states to invest in
establishing a rule of law to attract FDI. Pointing to the case of Singapore, Silverstein (2003)
mentions how the city-state invested heavily in adopting a rule of law and combating corruption
in order to attract FDI, in the process experiencing rapid economic growth and prosperity from
trade and investment opportunities.
Based on other scholarship regarding the rule of law, economic globalization and the
opportunities it entails is not in itself strong enough to encourage the adoption of a rule of law
to strengthen state capacity and thus better manage the phenomenon. Charron (2013) mentions
how less developed East European states have consistently had higher levels of corruption than
the more developed West European states with a richer history of the rule of law being in
existence. This is because increased access to markets resulting from economic globalization can
create new opportunities to engage in corruption that, with the absence of a rule of law, can
erode
state capacity. Due to a lack of a rule of law typical of developing states, the risks for economic
globalization and state capacity is distinctly threatening to developing states. Eakin and Lemos
(2006) argues that economic globalization without a rule of law can lead to a concentration of
power in elites as newly privatized industries are used as vehicles for patronage rather than the
welfare of the national population. Therefore, the existence of a rule of law is important for
managing economic globalization by eliminating the opportunities for corruption that increases

with its spread. The absence of a rule of law that disproportionately impacts developing states is
a major factor in economic globalization reducing state capacity in those states because they lack
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institutions to combat endemic levels of corruption that can result.
Having analyzed scholarship regarding the role international and national institutions play in
developing states with respect to economic globalization's impact on state capacity, I examine
other characteristics of developing states that are important to achieve a complete understanding
where state capacity is concerned. The societal, political, and economic structures of developing
states are also important to analyze. One of these is the existence of of multi-ethnic states which,
as Jinadu (2010) argues, exists disproportionately in the developing world as a result of the
legacy of colonialism. As Olzak (2010) argues, multi-ethnic states are particularly vulnerable to
weakened state capacity resulting from economic globalization. The economic structure,
particularly in the case of natural resource dependent economies, is another important topic as
ElGindi (2017) mentions such economies naturally have weaker state capacities that are
threatened further by economic globalization. The regime type as it relates to state capacity and
its influence on economic globalization is also relevant. This is because Cerny (1999) argues
democracies have weaker state capacity as they require collective action to act and as a result are
less able to deal with the adverse effects of economic globalization and experience weakened
state capacity as a result. Analyzing scholarship regarding these structural factors of developing
states is important for conceptualizing a number of control variables that will be used and
discussed further in the results and analysis section of this work.

Economic globalization poses distinct risks for state capacity in developing states with high
levels of ethnic heterogeneity. Putzel (2005) argues that the increase in intra-state conflict within
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multi-ethnic states is related to the spread of economic globalization since the end of the Cold
War. In the case of intra-state conflict, economic globalization has brought on pressure to
developing states that has resulted in outright state failure in the form of ethnic mobilization and
subsequent conflict. Olzak (2010) explains this trend by discussing how multi-ethnic states in the
developing world are especially vulnerable to reduced state capacity from economic
globalization. Economic globalization creates more opportunity for inequalities to emerge; in the
case of multi-ethnic developing states inequality coinciding with identity groups, then
becoming known as horizontal inequalities. These inequalities are known as the most explosive
and likely to cause conflict and subsequent state failure as ethnic identity is reinforced while
grievances are generated that motivate group mobilization and conflict (Olzak, 2010). Therefore,
with developing states unable to combat this inequality through social reforms, horizontal
inequalities resulting from economic globalization remain unmitigated and reduced state capacity
results. Olzak (2010) also found empirically that economic globalization above all other
categories of the phenomenon reduces state capacity most strongly in multi-ethnic developing
states. Olzak (2010) determined that severity of civil conflict is worst in multi-ethnic
developing states when ethnic grievances are economic. These findings attest to the unique risk
multi-ethnic developing states face from economic globalization as it can produce horizontal
inequalities the state often cannot mitigate and reduction of state capacity as well as state failure

can result.
In addition to creating horizontal inequalities, economic globalization poses other risks for
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state capacity in multi-ethnic developing states. Economic globalization can create more
opportunities for corruption to occur that can favor certain ethnic groups at the expense of others.
This can generate grievances as privatized industries are used as vehicles for ethnic favoritism
while national funds are directed disproportionately towards ethnic groups. This can cause group
mobilization, ethnic unrest, and even conflict which in turn weakens state capacity (Olzak,
2010). Economic globalization can also increase consciousness about one’s ethnicity as
increased
exposure to trade broadens opportunities for cultural exchanges that spawn ideas. This, however,
makes ethnic mobilization more likely as increased consciousness is likely to consolidate group
cohesion and make them much more aware of inequities in society. As economic
globalization can exacerbate these inequities, state capacity faces enormous pressure
from the threat of ethnic unrest once it becomes more likely to occur and when it does state
capacity is reduced considerably (Olzak, 2010). As much of the developing world consists of
multi-ethnic states as an enduring legacy of colonialism, this is a legitimate issue to analyze in
order to gain a better understanding of the vulnerability of multi-ethnic developing states’
capacities in the face of economic globalization. Based on scholarship, multi-ethnic developing
states have a unique risk of state failure resulting from economic globalization. Having analyzed
Olzak (2010) and Putzel (2005) it can be better understood how neoliberal economic reforms
consistent with the orthodoxy of economic globalization have coincided with the proliferation of

intra-state conflict throughout the developing world. Conflicts so often center around issues of
identity and horizontal inequalities that economic globalization can greatly exacerbate.
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Natural resource dependent economies are disproportionately located in the developing
world. This is because, as ElGindi (2017) argues, such economies are generally underdeveloped
to begin with for a variety of reasons. Natural resource dependent economies lose the incentive
to establish both economic diversification and tax collecting institutions. This results in higher
unemployment, poverty, and economic underdevelopment overtime as the lack of tax collecting
institutions undercuts the ability of the state to fund goods and services as well as invest in
human capital through education and healthcare. Natural resource dependent economies also
have more opportunity for corruption that can stifle development and erode legitimacy for the
government (ElGindi, 2017). Therefore, as natural resource dependent states in the developing
world already have weaker state capacity based on their economic structure, economic
globalization, ElGindi (2017) argues, has had major negative implications for state capacity in
these developing states. In order to attract FDI from the energy industry natural resource
dependent states have engaged in what Evans (1997) refers to previously in this work in
a “race to the bottom” to attract investment. This has led to the erosion of what public services
have existed as public spending and other mechanisms for social welfare have been rolled back
in order to entice FDI (ElGindi, 2017). This is another example supporting Rudra’s (2002)
argument that the developing world has disproportionately been impacted by gutting the welfare
state in order to conform with neoliberal orthodoxy. Such a “race to the bottom” proves

particularly problematic for natural resource dependent states in the developing world and its
relation to state capacity. This is because such economies in developing states inevitably have
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more inequality from lack of economic diversity or sufficient tax collecting institutions.
Economic globalization therefore sharply reduces state capacity as these states lack such
institutions to manage rising inequality and more opportunities for corruption that can result
from economic globalization (ElGindi, 2017).
The argument advanced by ElGindi (2017) that natural resource dependent developing states
naturally have weaker capacities that are reduced further by economic globalization is contested
by Kurtz and Brooks (2011). Kurtz and Brooks (2011) take a hybrid approach to economic
globalization’s impact on state capacity in developing states with natural resource dependent
economies. Natural resource dependency does not monolithically lead to weaker state capacity;
rather, they argue, the effect depends on the national institutions that are in place. Most
importantly, investment in human capital through education in natural resource dependent
developing states is a means to increase both state capacity and economic growth with the
occurrence of economic globalization (Kurtz and Brooks, 2011). Kurtz and Brooks (2011) argue
that this investment in human capital will result in a more educated and skilled population which,
with increased exposure to trade through economic globalization, will be able to utilize
opportunities for innovation in developmentally favorable ways. This will lead to an increase in
state capacity from economic growth and modernization driven by this skilled workforce
embracing economic globalization.

The importance of national institutions and policies that determine economic globalization’s
varying degrees of influence on state capacity in natural resource dependent economies in the
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the developing world goes beyond human capital investments as Kurtz and Brooks (2011) argue.
The existence of a rule of law is decisive for natural resource dependent developing states as it
can deter corruption, one of the most destructive traits of the resource curse for state capacity.
The existence of a rule of law and how it relates to natural resource dependent economies is one
of the primary fault lines between states experiencing enhanced and reduced state capacity from
natural resource production as Kurtz and Brooks (2011) argue. The examples of increased oil
production from Great Britain and Norway in the North Sea enhancing state capacity from
economic growth and oil dependency reducing state capacity overtime as in the case of Angola
and Nigeria are examples of the importance of a rule of law (Kurtz and Brooks, 2011). This is
because with the onset of economic globalization natural resource wealth can be used for corrupt
purposes such as smuggling, co-optation, and ethno-religious favoritism that with the absence of
a rule of law can erode state capacity. This is relevant to the developing world as ElGindi (2017)
mentions most natural resource dependent economies fall into the developing world and how
their exposure to economic globalization can cause distinct but according to scholarship
disputed risks for state capacity in these developing states.
Kurtz and Brooks (2011) presents an intriguing theory regarding the hybrid nature of
economic globalization’s impact on state capacity for states with natural resource dependency.
Their emphasis on the importance of institutions at the national level conforms with the

arguments of Williamson (2005), Robinson (2008), and Moore (2011) regarding the importance
of institutions to manage economic globalization and ensure it does not lead to weakened state
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capacity. One major shortcoming of Kurtz and Brooks’ (2011) argument, however, is the
assumption that developing states have the capacity to invest in human capital and utilize
institutions such as a bureaucratic apparatus and rule of law. As Williamson (2005) and
Robinson
(2008) argue, economic globalization has reduced state capacity in developing states because of
the lack of such national institutions like a rule of law and competent bureaucratic apparatus
capable of generating revenue. The comparison between Great Britain and Norway and their
success with natural resource production compared to Nigeria and Angola’s struggle with the
resource curse highlights precisely how developing states with natural resource dependent
economies are at a unique risk for reduced state capacity from economic globalization.
The reason why these states are at increased risk for reduced state capacity is because many
developing states do not have a rule of law or competent civil service like Great Britain and
Norway. Necessary institutions for deterring corruption, generating revenue to fund public
services, and undergoing economic diversification to reduce unemployment and poverty while
enjoying the high levels of economic growth from natural resource production. On the contrary,
developing states with natural resource dependent economies are unable to manage increased
opportunities for corruption and inequality that come with economic globalization and
experience reduced state capacity as a result. This is because they lack the institutions necessary

for mitigating those risks such as bureaucratic institutions, public services, and a rule of law that
developed states like Great Britain and Norway possess (Robinson, 2008). Developing states also
cannot be expected to make necessary investments in the human capital that Kurtz and Brooks
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(2011) argues is so critical for natural resource dependent economies.The lack of tax collecting
institutions coupled with the slashing of public services in a “race to the bottom” that ElGindi
(2017) mentions occurred in these developing states to attract FDI has made such investments
impossible. These contesting theories between natural resource dependency, state capacity,
and how it is influenced by economic globalization will be empirically tested in the results
and analysis section of this work.
Regime type in developing states is important to understand as it can determine state capacity
and its ability to manage economic globalization. Cerny (1999) argues that democracies
themselves typically have weaker state capacity. This is because democracies are more likely to
experience collective action problems in the form of gridlock compared to authoritarian regimes,
as their centralized leadership style requires no collective agreement amongst various parties
(Cerny, 1999). Therefore, as democratic regimes are more likely to possess less state capacity
than authoritarian regimes, this suggests that democracies in developing states have been less
able to manage economic globalization and are more vulnerable to reduced state capacity. Cerny
(1999) argues democracies have been less able to manage challenges to state capacity arising
from economic globalization such as the rise of MNCs, liberalized capital flows, and non-state
actors emerging within borders such as organized crime and rebel groups. As these developments

driven by economic globalization have reduced state capacity in developing states regardless of
regime type, Cerny (1999) argues such developments provide unique challenges to democratic
regimes. This is because of higher opportunity for gridlock in democratic regimes that can
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paralyze an effective government response to these issues. As a result, democracies are less able
to provide for the domestic security of their citizens in comparison to authoritarian regimes able
to unleash unbridled force on challenges to state authority, organized crime, and rebel groups in
particular. Cerny (1999) attributes these factors to the global trend of rising authoritarianism as
developing states see an interest in adopting authoritarian regimes to better manage the stresses
of economic globalization rather than investing in the institutions necessary to manage it.
Explanation and Hypothesis:
Having analyzed relevant scholarship, it is apparent that economic globalization has had the
effect of reducing state capacity in developing states. Using economic globalization as the central
explanatory variable, with state capacity acting as the dependent variable, an empirical
relationship can be established. Based on relevant scholarship analyzed in the literature review
section, I hypothesize that:
H1: Economic globalization will result in reduced state capacity in the case of
developing states.

The logic behind the hypothesis that I seek to argue is based on scholarship and the informed
assumption of economic globalization leading to reduced state capacity in developing states.
As Robinson (2008) makes clear, developing states have struggled to manage economic

globalization because they lack the necessary institutions in place to manage the phenomenon
effectively. With the absence of a competent civil service, rule of law, tax collecting institutions,
and a sufficient social welfare state, state capacity is weak as developing countries are less able
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to provide goods and services as well as exercise a monopoly on the use of force within their
borders. Economic globalization and its more adverse effects such as rising inequality and
corruption therefore can exacerbate these issues of state capacity, leading to a weaker state
overall. As Putzel (2005) also mentions how the international institutions playing a role in
economic globalization such as the IMF and World Bank are Western institutions, the
developing
world is consistently forced to globalize on the terms of the developed world. Jinadu (2010)
argues this results in an uneven power dynamic between developed and developing states and
once those developing states are pressured to adopt a globalized economy under the neoliberal
model, reduced state capacity results as these states lack the institutions to sustain this transition.
Williamson (2005) also argues the importance of institution building for developing states,
noting how the developed world’s focus on neoliberal policy rather than institutions has resulted
in developing states embracing economic globalization and subsequently experiencing reduced
state capacity. Therefore, the logic behind this hypothesis is informed by scholarship and the
knowledge of the importance of effective governing institutions for state capacity many
developing states lack. This hypothesis will be tested empirically and subsequently analyzed in
the results and analysis section of this work.
Research Design and Methodology:

The dataset used to conduct this empirical test is from the Dahlberg and Holmberg et. al
(2019) QOG time series cross section dataset. The dataset extends from 1946-2018. The unit of
analysis for this dataset and empirical test is the country year (Dahlberg and Holmberg et. al,
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2019).
The dependent variable used to represent state capacity in this dataset is government
effectiveness, coded as wbgi_gee. The variable government effectiveness represents important
components of state capacity such as quality of public services and the bureaucracy,
effectiveness at implementing government policy, the sincerity and competence of the
government in enacting those policies, and its ability to distribute public goods and services
(Dahlberg and Holmberg et.al, 2019). The variable is operationalized as a standard normal
distribution, and is continuous measured from values of negative two point five to positive two
point five, with lower numbers indicating poorer government effectiveness and higher levels
indicating better government effectiveness. (Dalhberg and Holmberg et. al, 2019). The actual
variable used in the empirical analysis was generated from government effectiveness in order to
measure more precisely. The new variable, newgovef, captures the core aspects of state capacity
in government effectiveness. This variable newgovef is continuous, measured on a scale of
zero to five, with higher numbers indicating more government effectiveness and lower numbers
reflecting less government effectiveness. This variable enables a more accurate empirical test of
economic globalization’s impact on state capacity as it includes only developing states and
excludes developed states from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD).1 Therefore, this empirical test will include non-OECD countries using newgovef as the
dependent variable to produce a sample reflective of the developing world.
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One notable shortcoming of the dependent variable government effectiveness is its inability
to distinguish between different institutions in place that can strengthen state capacity. This
denies us the opportunity to measure empirically whether certain institutions play a stronger role
in enhancing state capacity, such as a competent civil service, rule of law, social welfare state,
or tax collecting institutions. Being able to have done so would generate an opportunity for the
social science community to understand which national institutions are most important in
strengthening state capacity in order to understand policy implications for building state capacity
in developing states. Whether certain institutions are interdependent or prerequisites for
establishing other institutions afterwards are valuable facts for policy makers to know in building
state capacity in developing states. Nonetheless, the variable covers core aspects of state capacity
that will enable us to achieve a broad understanding of economic globalization’s impact on state
capacity in developing states and what policy implications empirical data produces.
The central explanatory variable in this dataset is economic globalization, coded as dr_eg. It
is represented in levels of integration in the global economy through trade, FDI, and exchange of
capital and services between states. It is measured continuously from a scale of one to
one hundred, with lower levels indicating less economic globalization and higher levels
indicating more economic globalization (Dalhberg and Holmberg et. al, 2019).
1

List of OECD Countries :https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/

Control variables in the Dahlberg and Holmberg et. al (2019) dataset were meant to influence
state capacity in this empirical analysis. Through their use, a better and more complete
understanding regarding state capacity in developing states and how it is influenced by economic
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globalization can be achieved. The control variable oil production, measured in levels of oil
production values in 2014, is coded as ross_oil_value_2014 (Dahlberg and Holmberg et.al,
2019). This control variable is an opportunity to examine empirically the effect of natural
resource dependence on state capacity that was discussed in detail in the literature review
section. It also presents an opportunity to resolve empirically the contesting arguments presented
by ElGindi (2017) and Kurtz and Brooks (2011) regarding the role of natural resource
dependency on state capacity in developing states that was analyzed in the literature review
section of this work. I anticipate that the empirical study will support ElGindi’s (2017) argument
that natural resource dependency as measured in oil production values will have a negative
relationship to state capacity. This is because as ElGindi (2017) argues natural resource
dependency leads to lack of economic diversification, causing more poverty and
underdevelopment overtime but also higher levels of unemployment and less tax collecting
institutions to fund public services for citizens. The use of the rule of law is another control
variable that is an important indicator of state capacity. As Silverstein (2003) mentions, its
importance is ensuring government leaders are held accountable for their actions, deterring
corruption, and promoting transparency in economic and political transactions. In the Dahlberg
and Holmberg et.al (2019) dataset, the rule of law is coded as wbgi_cee. A measurement of

control of corruption, this variable represents the ability of the state to counter efforts by public
officials to use office for private gain, and ensure elites do not use the state for private benefit
(Dahlberg and Holmberg et. al, 2019). This is an opportunity to empirically measure the
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importance of the rule of law and its existence in strengthening state capacity in developing
states. I anticipate in this work that the rule of law will have a positive relationship with state
capacity and support Silverstein (2003) in his assertion that a rule of law is an important
component in having an effective state and stronger capacity. Ethnic fractionalization is another
control variable used in this study coded as al_ethnic. The variable is based on varying racial and
linguistic characteristics amongst various groups within states (Dahlberg and Holmberg et. al,
2019). Olzak (2010) argues how multi-ethnic states can have weaker state capacities. This is
because it can create more opportunity for division and embitterment amongst ethnic groups if
there is a perception of exclusion or discrimination. I anticipate that ethnic fractionalization will
support Olzak (2010) in her argument and therefore a negative relationship will exist between
ethnic fractionalization and state capacity. The last control variable used will be regime type,
coded as chga_demo. An advantage to this variable is its ability to distinguish between
democratic and non-democratic regimes. This variable is scored “0,” indicating that a state is not
a democracy, and “1,” indicating that a state is a democracy (Dahlberg and Holmberg et. al,
2019). This offers an opportunity to precisely measure regime type’s impact on state capacity in
developing states. Cerny (1999) argues that democratic regimes are likely to have weakened state
capacity because they can be constrained by collective action problems and the potentially

invaluable time lost in consensus building amongst various political factions. I therefore
anticipate a negative relationship between democratic regime type and state capacity. This
variable in particular offers an opportunity to examine empirically the relationship between
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regime type and state capacity and if such a negative relationship exists between democratic
regime type and state capacity. If so, an explanation can be offered for the global shift towards
authoritarianism seen over the years. States may be investing in authoritarian regimes rather than
in the necessary government institutions to strengthen state capacity in order to better manage
economic globalization. These control variables were precisely chosen and offer the opportunity
to gain a more complete understanding of factors influencing state capacity in developing states
and its relevance to economic globalization.
The methodology for this analysis included the ordinary least squares method, with a
regression model that can be replicated in the Dahlberg and Holmberg et. al (2019) dataset by the
command “reg newgovef dr_eg ross_oil_value_2014 wbgi_cce al_ethnic chga_demo.” The
standard for accepting or rejecting the hypothesis is based on the P value being less than or
greater than 0.05, with greater than indicating statistical insignificance while less than 0.05
indicate statistical significance regarding the empirical relationship.
Results and Analysis:
Table 1: Economic Globalization and Government Effectiveness (State
Capacity),1946-2018
Economic Globalization

0.007***
(0.0007)

Oil Production Values (2014)

Ethnic Fractionalization

6.73**
(3.24)
-0.153***
(0.04)
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Democracy

0.074***
(0.023)

Rule of Law

0.814***
(0.015)

Constant

2.164
(0.049)

Observations

1,247

R-Squared
0.81
________________________________________________________________________
*** if p<0.01 ** if p<0.05 * if p<0.1 coefficients above, standard error in parentheses
The empirical results from this test were both unexpected and highly significant. The central
explanatory variable, economic globalization, was found to have a positive relationship with
government effectiveness that, with a p value of zero, is statistically significant. This means that
the hypothesis of this work can be rejected as I predicted earlier in this work that economic
globalization will reduce state capacity. The empirical findings support Weiss (2000),
the lone dissenter among the scholarly arguments regarding the effect of economic globalization
on state capacity. Weiss’s (2000) argument that economic globalization can enhance state
capacity because of the economic growth and higher living standards that can result from it now
has significant empirical evidence supporting it. The results of this test regarding economic

globalization’s impact on government effectiveness representing state capacity indicates
that economic globalization for developing states is a significantly positive force that can
promise prosperity and higher living standards. Increased exposure to trade, FDI, and integration
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into the global economy through intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that maximize
developing states’ global influence, and regional integration to promote political and economic
cooperation are all aspects of economic globalization that can conceivably increase state capacity
for these developing states. This is because such policies have been shown to result in higher
levels of economic development and higher living standards overtime that will increase state
capacity as these states become wealthier, more influential, and through strengthened state
capacity more stable in the long term. However, the importance of government policies and
institutions within these developing states can still be considered essential in order to enable the
state to manage economic globalization and its potential socio-economic strains effectively to
benefit from the phenomenon which in itself is a force for strengthened state capacity.
The control variables were also statistically significant in their relationships with
government effectiveness, indicating the importance of each in affecting state capacity.
Surprisingly, oil production values in 2014 had a positive relationship with state capacity that
with a p value of less than 0.05 is statistically significant. This indicates that higher levels of oil
production can actually enhance state capacity. The explanation for this result contradicting my
prediction regarding the relationship could be that the mere production of oil does not mean

natural resource dependency, as in some diversified economies it could be another sector of it
that contributes to growth. Nonetheless, the results of this empirical test support Kurtz and
Brooks (2011) argument that natural resource production can increase economic prosperity and
through that state capacity. The empirical results contradict ElGindi (2017) in his argument that
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natural resource production weakens state capacity as it indicates natural resource dependency.
The finding also contradicts my prediction in this work that oil production in 2014 would have a
negative relationship with state capacity.
Ethnic fractionalization was found to have a negative relationship with state capacity that
with a p value of zero is statistically significant. This indicates that higher levels of ethnic
fractionalization will weaken state capacity and provides empirical support for Olzak (2010) in
her argument that multi-ethnic states provide more opportunity for weaker states. This is because
more opportunity for division, discrimination, and exclusion exists that if not addressed can
result in domestic unrest and state failure in the case of civil war, weakening state capacity
greatly in the process. Multi-ethnic states can also be vulnerable to horizontal inequalities that if
not addressed will reinforce group cohesion and mobilization resulting in conflict and weakened
state capacity. This is relevant to economic globalization because inequality is considered one of
the primary adverse impacts of economic globalization. This, coupled with the empirical results
of this work underscores the vulnerability of multi-ethnic developing states regarding state
capacity and how it is impacted by economic globalization. The empirical results also affirm my
prediction regarding ethnic fractionalization having a negative relationship to state capacity as I

concurred with Olzak’s (2010) argument.
The control variable regime type was found to have a positive relationship with state capacity
that with a p value of zero is significant. These results indicate that higher levels of democracy
is associated with increased state capacity. Although this empirically contradicts my prediction
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based on Cerny’s (1999) argument that democracies have weaker state capacities and therefore a
negative relationship would exist between democratic regime and state capacity, the results are
understandable upon further analysis. Open political systems promote transparency, deter
corruption, and promote the concept of the rule of law. Democratic regimes also create an
environment where freedom of thought can encourage more opportunity for innovation,
competition, and new ideas that spark development and through that state capacity. These factors
contribute to attracting trade and FDI opportunities that strengthens the state. This is because
in democratic regimes frustration with leaders can be expressed through the outlet of elections,
not in civil unrest and revolution as can occur in authoritarian regimes where that outlet does not
exist. The empirical result from regime type’s relationship with state capacity should provide a
warning to states drifting into authoritarianism. Investing in institutions that strengthen the state
and democracy is a better long-term goal than adopting authoritarian regimes that on the surface
appear stronger. The results of this test are therefore important as it provides empirical evidence
of the merits between democracy and strengthened state capacity.
The control variable rule of law was found to have a positive relationship with state capacity
that with a p value of zero is significant. This indicates the importance of the rule of law

measured in control of corruption in the Dahlberg and Holmberg et. al (2019) dataset. The
empirical evidence supports Silverstein (2003) in his argument that a rule of law is critical to
deterring corruption, having an independent judiciary that enforces contracts, and mechanisms
for holding leaders accountable when they abuse their office for personal gain. It also empirically
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supports my prediction that a rule of law would have a positive relationship for state capacity.
The information acquired from this empirical test highlights the importance of the rule of
law for state capacity and how it can better attract and manage economic globalization. Also,
how the lack of a rule of law can weaken state capacity as the state lacks the capacity to hold
leaders accountable, deter corruption, and enforce contracts that creates a hazardous environment
for trade and FDI, hallmarks of economic globalization.
In summary, the empirical results are highly significant yet surprising. It can now be inferred
that economic globalization has a positive effect on enhancing state capacity overtime. This
serves as evidence that economic globalization in itself is a positive phenomenon that must be
managed diligently and effectively by developing states, not avoided outright. However,
effective management of economic globalization is critical at the international and national level
to ensure economic globalization is able to be a force for prosperity and not instability that can
weaken state capacity in the developing world. The importance of natural resource production, if
part of a diversified economy, can also serve to strengthen state capacity through economic
growth and trade that this study provides empirical support for. The vulnerability of multi-ethnic
states to weak state capacity and how it can be exacerbated by economic globalization is also

highlighted in this study. Given Jinadu’s (2010) assertion that a disproportionate amount of
multi-ethnic states exist in the developing world as an enduring legacy of colonialism,
multi-ethnic states should be aware of the unique problems they can face for state capacity in
the face of economic globalization. The empirical evidence for regime type represents a
Zak 38
refreshing rebuttal to the argument that democracies are less able to manage economic
globalization due to reduced state capacity. In fact, empirical evidence exists that democratic
regimes can strengthen state capacity, indicating the shortcomings of democracies reverting to
authoritarianism in the hopes they can better manage economic globalization. Empirical evidence
also supports the importance of the rule of law in strengthening state capacity. The merit for
developing states to invest in mechanisms for holding leaders accountable and an independent
judiciary are crucial for state capacity and its ability to manage economic globalization as
empirical data supports this.
The significance of the positive relationship between economic globalization and state
capacity may have contradicted the hypothesis of this work. However, when analyzing control
variables it can be understood how certain traits and institutions within states play a major role in
state capacity and how it impacts the ability of the state to manage economic globalization
effectively in order to avoid reduced state capacity. The results of this work also present policy
implications for developing states to ensure economic globalization is a positive force able to be
enjoyed by these states, not a potential source for instability and reduced state capacity.
Discussion and Conclusion:

According to the findings of this work, it is clear that economic globalization is in itself a
positive force for economic growth and development that can translate into enhanced state
capacity for developing states. The phenomenon, however, requires effective management at the
international and national levels in order for its opportunities to be utilized and risks mitigated.
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The neoliberal model of globalization is in itself unsustainable as it prevents states from being
proactive and engaged in mitigating the socio-economic stresses of economic globalization such
as rising inequality, corruption, and labor displacement from automation. Economic
globalization
therefore should be based on pragmatic policy, not ideology, as it has been.This is important in
order to tailor economic development policies for the distinct traits of each developing state in
order to manage the phenomenon effectively and enjoy its benefits to enhance rather than
weaken state capacity.
Regarding international institutions that play such an important role in economic
globalization in the developing world, institutions such as the IMF and World Bank should focus
on institution building as much as policy, as Williamson (2005) advocates. This will enable
structural adjustment programs to have an enduring impact on state capacity as the IMF and
World Bank work to export institutions such as a rule of law, civil service, and tax collecting
institutions to fund development and public services. Such an emphasis on institution building
will strengthen the state in the long-term and therefore its ability to manage the strains resulting
from economic globalization. Through an emphasis on institution building at the domestic level
and help from international institutions allied with states possessing those institutions, an

enduring and more successful strategy for economic development can be achieved, enhancing
state capacity in the developing world in the process.
Along with institution building to strengthen state capacity and better manage economic
globalization, international institutions should focus less on ideology and more on pragmatic
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policies designed to achieve modernization. A role for the state in the economy and appreciation
for its ability to drive growth and development, anathema to neoliberals, should be recognized.
As Evans (1997) mentions the role of government in the economy in the successful economic
development of the East Asian states Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and later China.
The government played a positive role in investing national resources into infrastructure and the
economy, driving successful growth and development overtime. The government was also
involved in protecting fragile domestic industries from foreign competition, liberalizing trade
once those companies were able to compete globally and succeeded as a result. Restrictions on
capital flows by the government also encouraged financial stability and combated
overspeculation to generate an environment for sustainable economic growth in the long term
(Evans, 1997). These economic policies directly contradicted neoliberalism as an ideology, but
were successful because the state was proactively engaged in the economic globalization process
and better able to mitigate its excesses. These success stories contrasted with the neoliberal
model marketed by the IMF and World Bank, but the historical record supports Evans (1997)
and indicates the need to concede a role for government in economic development to manage
economic globalization and enhance state capacity. The East Asian states were also able to

modernize at their own pace and on their own terms, not under rigid ideological pressure from
the IMF and World Bank, as occurred in numerous African and Latin American countries during
the 1980s and the 1990s. Recognizing the shortcomings of neoliberalism and how it strips the
state of its capacity to manage economic globalization is important in order for international
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institutions to develop structural adjustment programs that truly benefit developing states and
enhance state capacity. It is through pragmatic economic policies designed to achieve modernity
and higher living standards, rather than ideological orthodoxy, that international institutions can
tailor economic development programs to meet the unique characteristics of individual states in
order to be successful. Through this, economic globalization can be managed effectively and
present unparalleled opportunities for developing states that will strengthen its capacity and
therefore stability in the long term.
Efforts to increase representation in the global economic community for developing states is
another important factor in ensuring economic globalization remains a positive force for state
capacity. As Putzel (2005) mentions how international economic institutions have traditionally
favored the developed world because they created them through Bretton Woods, economic
assistance historically has been for the benefit of developed states rather than the sole benefit of
developing ones. Jinadu (2010) argues the importance of developing states being represented in
global economic institutions in order to strengthen their ability to resist attempts by the
developed world to violate their economic sovereignty. This could enable developing states to
influence global economic development programs that serve the interests of developing states

rather than the developed world motivated by expanding access to markets for trade. Increased
regional integration is a means to achieve this as it can maximize the regional influence of
developing states as well as promote economic globalization between them that can drive growth
and higher living standards (Jinadu, 2010). This would also serve to strengthen state capacity in
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these states as they would be supporting each other both politically and economically, providing
opportunities for the mutual adoption of institutions so critical for stronger state capacity.
Therefore, increasing representation for the developing world in deciding global economic
development is important for ensuring these programs truly benefit developing states, not the
sole interests of the developed world.
Developing states also have a role to play at the national level in ensuring economic
globalization does not reduce state capacity in order to enjoy its benefits. Governments must be
active in the economic development process to invest public resources in infrastructure and the
economy to stimulate job growth, trade, tax revenue, and efficient means of transportation. These
economic policies coupled with a competent civil service to oversee transactions and regulate
emerging markets will strengthen state capacity and better prepare it to manage economic
globalization (Robinson, 2008). The establishment of stronger labor movements is also important
as Rudra (2002) argues labor movements can pressure governments to be involved in ensuring
adequate living standards and human security through social welfare policies. This will
strengthen state capacity and its ability to mitigate the inequalities resulting from economic
globalization that in the absence of a social welfare state can potentially weaken state capacity.

Although this can deter foreign investment and contradicts neoliberalism, this is a sensible long
term strategy to ensuring a more sustainable economic globalization that guarantees
socio-economic security for citizens. The governments of developing states must also make the
necessary investments in human capital through education and healthcare to produce a skilled
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and healthy population ready to work in the most innovative industries (Kurtz and Brooks,
2011). This will encourage both human and economic development and raise living standards
overtime that will strengthen state capacity and ensure economic globalization does not weaken
it. The involvement of the government in the economic development and globalization process is
therefore essential to ensure that the state has the capacity to manage economic globalization
effectively to mitigate its risks and enjoy its benefits.
The establishment of a rule of law is also important for strengthening state capacity, as this
work has found statistically significant empirical evidence that it strengthens it. An independent
judiciary, with the ability to reaffirm constitutions, enforce contracts, and deter corruption by
holding elites accountable is critical to strong state capacity and state stability. As the empirical
evidence of this work supports Silverstein (2003) and his argument of the importance of the rule
of law, it can be understood its importance to combating the increased opportunity for corruption
that comes with economic globalization. The relationship between the rule of law and democratic
regime, also empirically significant to state capacity, is another discovery from the empirical
analysis of this work. More research from the social science community regarding the
relationship between the rule of law and democratic regime in how both can strengthen state

capacity should be investigated further. This is because authoritarian regimes can often be
considered incompatible with a rule of law, as leaders are often not held accountable for their
actions as they enjoy authoritarian powers. Further investigation into the empirical relationship
of these two concepts and how it relates to state capacity can better prepare the social science
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community to make policy recommendations. It also can offer empirical evidence of the value of
democracy promotion for state building in developing states, and if a rule of law is a necessary
institution to sustain it. Understanding this relationship will better equip policy makers with the
necessary recommendations to ensure developing states do not experience reduced state capacity
as a result of economic globalization and if its related to the existence of a rule of law or
democratic regime type.
In conclusion, economic globalization is a major phenomenon with significant impacts on
state capacity in the developing world. Economic globalization is a positive force that promises
to lift millions out of poverty and drive modernization in developing states. However, it is a
phenomenon that places socio-economic strains on populations and thus requires an active and
institutionalized state to mitigate those strains. Under the neoliberal model, states have been
rendered unable to proactively manage the stresses of economic globalization such as rising
inequality, corruption, crime, and labor displacement that can weaken state capacity. Developing
states must be allowed to embrace economic globalization in their own way and through
pragmatic policies tailored to the distinct traits of each state. By doing this, developing states can
retain their economic sovereignty and embrace economic globalization in a sustainable manner

in order to enjoy increased prosperity and through that increased state capacity. In achieving this
developing states can experience more successful economic development and strengthened state
capacity that would promise a more prosperous, wealthy, and stable world that the developed and
developing worlds alike have an interest in promoting and maintaining.
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Appendix:
1. STATA Output With Summary Statistics:

2. Table of Variables and Operationalization:

Variable

Operationalization

Source

Government Effectiveness
(newgovef) (Dependent)

Continuous measure of
quality of government in
implementing policy, quality
of civil service, and
efficiency in distributing
goods and services. Measured
from zero to five with higher
numbers indicating more
government effectiveness
while lower numbers
indicating less government
effectiveness.

Dahlberg and Holmberg et. al
(2019) dataset where
“newgovef” generated from
variable government
effectiveness (wbgi_gee) to
include sample reflective of
developing states.

Economic Globalization
(dr_eg) (Central Explanatory
Variable)

Continuous measure of
Dahlberg and Holmberg et. al
integration into the world
(2019).
economy through trade and
foreign investment. Measured
from one to one-hundred with
higher numbers indicating
more economic globalization
while lower numbers
indicating less.

Oil Production Values 2014
(ross_oil_value_2014)
(Control)

Measure of oil production in
dollars from the year 2014.

Ross, Michael; Mahdavi,
Paasha, 2015, "Oil and Gas
Data, 1932-2014",
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/
ZTPW0Y, Harvard
Dataverse, V2,
UNF:6:xdrpUdF2kYUJYCgV
fgMGcQ== [fileUNF] from
Dahlberg and Holmberg et. al
(2019) dataset.

Rule of Law (wbgi_cce)
(Control)

Measure of control over
corruption and instances of
leaders using public office for
private gain.

World Wide Governance
Indicators
http://info.worldbank.org/gov
ernance/wgi/#home

Rule of Law cont.

Part of Dahlberg and
Holmberg et. al (2019)
dataset

Ethnic Fractionalization
(al_ethnic) (Control)

Measurement of levels of
diversity amongst ethnic
groups regarding language,
culture, and race within
states.

Dahlberg and Holmberg et. al
(2019) dataset.

Regime Type (chga_demo)
(Control)

Dichotomous, measures
regime type in a way that
distinguishes between
democratic and
non-democratic regimes.
Measured from zero to one
with lower numbers
indicating less democracy
while higher numbers
indicate more democracy.

Dahlberg and Holmberg et. al
(2019)

3. Summary Statistics Table:

Variable

Number of
Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Government
Effectiveness
(State
Capacity)

1,247

2.114842

0.7384755

0.2292459

4.936975

Economic
Globalization

1,247

49.83562

14.14948

16.71884

93.45932

Oil
Production
Values 2014

1,247

8.52e+09

2.92e+10

0

3.65e+11

Ethnic
Fractionalizat
-ion

1,247

0.506629

0.2470181

0

0.930175

Rule of Law

1,247

-0.4260496

.7315019

-1.722926

2.32558

Regime Type

1,247

0.4530874

0.4979941

0

1

